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Abstract
The Kashmir conflict has been a grave concern for regional and international peace
and security by provoking cross-border terrorism and nuclear proliferation, two key
global issues. In the meantime, it has become more and more evident that without the
help of the international community India and Pakistan alone cannot solve the conflict.
This article argues that the Kashmir conflict needs to be mediated by an impartial
third-party major power with the ability to exert leverage on and provide incentives
for both India and Pakistan. But it is also important to consider who could best fulfill
the criteria for such a role. For this reason, this study also attempts to research the
roles and potential of four major powers - namely the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan
- in South Asian conflict management. Based on the comparison the study concludes
that Japan is in the strongest position to mediate the Kashmir dispute.
Keywords : South Asia, Kashmir Conflict, Conflict Management, Third Party
Mediation, Major Power, Impartiality, Leverage, and Incentives
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The deep-rooted historic rivalry between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has been
a long-running concern for international peace and security since the independence of
these two countries in 1947. In the last half a century, Pakistan and India have fought
three full-scale wars, a mini war in Kargil in 1999, and also prepared for a destructive
war (possibly nuclear) in 2002 over Kashmir. Today, the conflict overlaps with other
security issues: ethnic conflict, cross-border terrorism, human rights violations, and
nuclear proliferation m South Asia. Nevertheless, India and Pakistan have failed to
resolve the dispute. Although the ongoing peace process is encouraging, there is a fear
that at any time this peaceful environment could turn tense, as has occurred in the
past. Related to this, Stephen P. Cohen of the Brookings Institution notes that the
peace effort is not likely to go very far because sooner or later something will disrupt
the relationship." On the other hand, due to Indian opposition, the United Nations has
failed to implement its resolution for a plebiscite in Kashmir. At the same time, it is
also observed that neither mere diplomatic pressure by the international community
nor military intervention can bring a realistic end to the conflict, since both countries
possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, this study argues that the Kashmir dispute needs
to be mediated by an impartial third-party major power, which has leverage on both
India and Pakistan. But it is also important to consider who could best fulfill the
criteria for such a role. To seek an answer to the above question, this study attempts
to focus on a comparative analysis of the role of four major powers in managing the
South Asian conflict, namely the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan.
2. Criteria for an Effective Mediator
Conflict management scholars emphasize the importance of the role of third party
mediation m managing conflict when two adversaries fail to resolve a conflict by
themselves. There are various actors involved in mediation: states, the UN, regional
1 ) R.K. Radhakrishnan, "India's Peace offer to Pak may not go far, says Cohen," The Hindu, October
2003.
2 ) Jacob Bercovitch, edリResolving International Conflicね: 77はTheory and Practice of Mediation (London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1996).
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organizations, NGOs and individuals. However, individual mediators and NGOs lack the
requisite leverage for effective mediation. On the other hand, due to the involvement of
so many states, the UN and regional organizations often complicate the decision
making process for conflict resolution. Hence, a state, particularly a major power that
has impartiality and leverage, is ideally suited to mediate a conflict more effectively.
There is a debate on the importance of impartiality and leverage as the most
important criteria when choosing a mediator. Berridge argued that the third party
must be substantially impartial in the dispute, at least once the negotiation has
started, and the issue is actually on the agenda. Young noted that in most cases a
meaningful role for a third party mediator will depend on the party's impartiality in
the conflict. If an intervening party is perceived as partial to one side or other, it
loses its status as a true third party. However, Zartman and Touval argued that the
mediation process succeeds not merely when a mediator is unbiased or impartial, but
when he or she possesses resources and leverage that either disputant values. Thus for
them leverage is more important than impartiality for effective mediation.　The
author considers that the most important factor is a mediator's impartiality. A third
party that has ability in other respects but lacks impartiality should probably not be
the first or best choice. If an actor meets both requirements, it can be an even more
effective mediator in managing a conflict.
3. The Role of Major Powers in Managing the Conflict between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir
South Asia has been considered an important region for its significant geo-political
location. In addition, the　9/ll terrorist attack and subsequent "War Against
l
Terrorism' have made this region even more important for the international
community. All major powers have been involved in the region as a result of their
respective political, economic and strategic interests. However, this section attempts to
3 ) G.R. Berridge, Dipわmacy: Theory and Practice, Second Edition (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 188.
4 ) Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis即ew Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1967), p. 81.
5 ) 1. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era," in Chester
A. Crocker & Fen Osier Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and
Responses to International Conflict (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), pp. 445-451.
206 国際公共政策研究 第11巻第1号
focus on the role of non-regional actors, especially four major powers　-　the U.S.,
Russia, China, and Japan - m South Asian conflict management.
U.S. Policy Toward South Asia: Changing Strategy 一acks Credibility
The U.S. has influenced South Asian political and security affairs since the early
stages of the Cold War. It has played an assertive role particularly in restraining India
and Pakistan from launching a war over Kashmir several times in the last fifteen
years. However, all these efforts were short-term crisis management. The U.S. has
failed to bring any permanent solution to the conflict. From another point of view,
too, U.S. policy towards South Asia lacks credibility. Part of this reason for this is
that the U.S. has changed its strategy and priorities several times based on its
national interests. During the Cold War, Pakistan became an ally of the United States.
Due to India's close relationship with the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Pakistan signed
a defense treaty in 1954 to contain Soviet influence in this region. During the Ind0-
Pakistan war m 1965 and Bangladeshi independence war in 1971, the U.S. supported its
ally Pakistan. Following Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in.December 1979, the U.S.
promoted its 、economic and military relationships with Pakistan to aid the forces
(Mujahidin) against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.
However, after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. began to alienate Pakistan, and tilt
toward India as Washington and New Delhi turned from the 'estranged democracies'of
the Cold War to 'engaged democracies.I Various actions by the U.S. revealed the
priority it now gave to India. First, the U.S. promoted economic, political and military
relationship with India. Second, the U.S. asked Pakistan to respect the Line of Control
(LOC) that was more favorable to India. During the Kargil crisis in 1999, the U.S. was
critical of Pakistan and called for an urgent end to the Kargil conflict by restoring the
LOC. Third, India became the largest recipient in South Asia of U.S. development and
food aid. U.S. assistance to India in FY 2000 reached a total of $170 million, more than
6 ) Stephen Cohen, "The US and South Asia," The Br.仰kings lnstituかon, January 2005, available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/cohens/20050101.pdf (accessed on May 10, 2006).
7 ) Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Matto, eds., Engaged Democracies: India-US Relaわons in the 21st Century
New Delhi: Har-Anand Publication Pvt. Ltd., 2000.
8 ) Howard B. Schaffer, "Reconsidering the U.S. Role," The Washington Quar加rly (Spring 2001), Vol.
p.202.
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45 times that to Pakistan (only $3.78 million),9'whereas Pakistan had received $600
million annually in the 1980s.ll
Following 9/ll, the U.S. foreign policy towards South Asia has again undergone a
fundamental change.ll'The U.S. has rebuilt the alliance relationship with Pakistan.
According to Teresita C. Schaffer, "The attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon turned U.S. South Asia policy temporarily upside down, bringing Pakistan
to center stage and putting parts of the U.S.-India agenda on hold."18 Both India and
Pakistan offered their full cooperation for the war against terrorism. However, for
strategic reasons the U.S. had to give priority to Pakistan's indispensable support for
the war m Afghanistan. The U.S. has supported Pakistan with a great amount of
economic aid for political, economic, and education reform in Pakistan since it joined
the war against terrorism.13'pakistan was also given the status of non-NATO ally of
the United States for its cooperation in the war against Terrorism.1'
Nevertheless, the U.S. has been careful not to allow the new U.S.-Pakistan alliance
to harm the U.S.-India relationship. In　2004, the U.S. government reiterated its
commitment to the Indian government to increase Indian access to American high
technology, nuclear power, and missile defense.15'However, even though the U.S. is
committed to supporting India, New Delhi has remained deeply concerned about the
Bush administration's increased links to Pakistan, particularly U.S. plans for renewed
sales of F-16 fighter aircraft to Islamabad. The Bush administration seems seriously
committed to improving its relationship with India. Nuclear cooperation between India
and the U.S., announced in a Joint Statement on July 18, 2005, is the latest
development in the U.S.-India relationship. President Bush agreed to give India virtual
membership in the club of recognized nuclear-weapons states created by the Nuclear-.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.T
9 ) Thomas Lum, U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients, Congressional Research
Service (CRS). Report for Congress, April 2002. Available at:
httpノ/www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/9661.pdf (accessed on May犯2005).
10) Zhang Guihong, "U.S. Security Policy Toward South Asia after September llth and Its Implication for
China: A Chinese Perspective." Occasional Paper, (Henry L. Stimson Center, January 2003) No. 50, p. 3.
ll) C. Raja Mohan, "A Paradigm Shift Toward South Asia?," The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2002-03),
Vol. 26, p. 141.
12) Teresita C. Schaffer, "The U.S. and South Asia: New Priorities, Familiar Interests," Global Beat Issue
Brief, No. 66, available at: www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib66.htm (accessed on June 20, 2005).
13) Zhang Guihong, op. ciと., p. ll.
14) Anwar Iqbal, "Non-NATO Status for Pakistan Approved," Dawn, June 3, 2004.
15) Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States and Asia in 2004," Asian Survey (January/ February 2005), Vol.
XLV,p.10.
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Nonproliferation Treaty.1 pakistan has become concerned about the warm U.S.-India
relationship and India-s attempts to get equal treatment from the U.S. It seems to the
author that current U.S. policy in South Asia is reasonably well-balanced. But both
India and Pakistan have their doubts about U.S. policy m this region.
It is well known that Pakistan has always encouraged third party mediation for the
termination of the Kashmir dispute while India opposes it. After 9/ll when the U.S.
and Pakistan began to rebuild relations, Pakistan requested the U.S. to mediate the
conflict. Due to the Pakistani request the U.S. expressed its desire to mediate the
Kashmir dispute in　2001. However, India rejected any third party mediation of the
conflict.1 Considering its relationship with India, the U.S. has encouraged both
countries to resolve the dispute through a bilateral peace process. Concerning the
settlement of the dispute, Ryan Crocker, the incumbent U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan,
noted that the U.S. can be helpful in advancing the ongoing peace process for the
settlement of the Kashmir dispute, but will not get involved in the middle of it to
mediate a solution.1
Russian Policy Toward South Asia: India is the Corner Stone
Because of the geographical proximity of South Asia, the Soviet Union viewed the
region as strategically important for its security. During the Cold War period the
objectives of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in South Asia were to contain the
U.S. and Chinese influence in this region. The Soviet Union built up a strong military
relationship with India to implement her goals. In the post Cold War period, Russia
has also maintained a good relationship with its long-term ally, India. Defense
relations have been at the center of their relationship. New Delhi has bought some
billion worth of weapons from Moscow since the 1960s. India is the only country
with which Russia conducts a long-term program of military industrial cooperation.
Moscow and New Delhi on January 20, 2004, signed a $1.6 billion deal finalizing India's
16) Strobe Talbott, "Good Day for India but Bad day for Non-Prohferation, Yak Global, July 21, 2005.
Avaibale at: http:/7yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id-60舶　　　　　on October 20, 2005); Also see,
"India, US Sign 10-year Pact to Expand Defense Ties, Hindustan Times, June 29, 2005.
17) "India Rejects U.S. Mediation with tie Pakistan" Dawn, October 15, 2001.
18) Nasir Jamal, "Ambassadors Rules out US Mediation on Kashmir," Dawn, December 10, 2004.
19) Linda Racioppi, Soviet PolわTowards South Asia Since 1970 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1994).
20) Sergei Blagov, "Arming Asia: Russia's $5 billion forte," Asia Times, January 21, 2004.
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purchase of Russian aircraft. Analysts believe that Russia will continue to be India's
mam arms supplier as it cannot find as lucrative and as big a market as India for its
defense production.2　At the same time, another goal of Russia's South Asian policy is
to create a Russia-India-China triangular alliance against the U.S. and its allies.2i
Meanwhile, the relationship between Russia and Pakistan is not friendly. There have
been some attempts to improve relations between Moscow and Islamabad recently, but
the results are modest so far. Russia wants to establish a balanced relationship with
Pakistan especially to combat Islamic terrorism in South Asia and Central Asia as
Russia views itself as a victim of Islamic terrorism in Chechnya. The Russian Foreign
Ministry believes that Pakistan explicitly permits international terrorists to conduct
operations against India from its territory. On December　4, 2002, while in India,
Russian President Vladimir Putin called upon Pakistan to destroy the terrorist
infrastructure serving separatist operations in Kashmir. However, Pakistan rejected
Putin's statement and asked Russia to do more about the genocide, human rights
violations, and rapes committed by the Indian Army in Kashmir.2'
Moscow's position on the Kashmir conflict has not changed since the Soviet period.
Russia regards Kashmir as a part of India. It sees Pakistan as supporting terrorism
and obstructing any solution to the Kashmir conflict. Therefore, from a Pakistani
perspective, Russia cannot be an impartial third party to mediate the Kashmir conflict.
Chinese Policy Toward South Asia: An All-weather Friendship with Pakistan
Although China is a big factor in South Asian security affairs, for China, South
Asia has long assumed somewhat greater importance, but by no means equal to that
of East Asia. However, China has maintained a special relationship with Pakistan.
China s leading English daily the People's Daily notes that Sino-Pakistan relations have
been tested through history and are neither fettered by ideology nor influenced by the
changing international situation.26'According to Ziad Haider, "China and Pakistan have
21) Tara Shankar Sahay, "Russia trips on Indian Defense Ties," Asia Times, October 26, 2005.
22) Martin Malek, "Russian Policy towards South Asia," Asian Survey (May/June 2004) Vol. XLIV, p. 387.
23) Ibid., pp. 391-396.
24) Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan to the Russian Ambassador quoted in B. Muralidhar
Reddy, Pak. Resents Putins Remarks," The Hindu (Madras), December 2, 2002.
25) Robert A. Scalapino, "US-PRC Relations and South Asia," in Zillur Rahman, ed., SAARC and Super
Power (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1991) p. 22.
26) "Boost all weather Partnership between China and Pakistan," People's Daily, April 5, 2005.
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maintained an all-weather'friendship based on their mutual interests m protecting
their borders against, and checking the influence of their rival neighbor India."2　The
issue of defense is at the core of China-Pakistan relations. Over the years China has
provided Pakistan with a wide range of major conventional weapons systems and
helped it to build nuclear weapons. Pakistan relies on China as a trusted ally in
dealing with India from a position of military weakness.
However, while maintaining a special relationship with Pakistan, China has recently
adopted a more balanced approach to India. Although India always indicates that
Chinese military and nuclear weapons are a threat to India, China is very reluctant
to reveal that India or Indian nuclear weapons are a concern for China. In Chinese
strategic calculations India is not as big a factor as the U.S. or Japan in the Asia
Pacific region, and China has thus not considered India a rival. Zhu Feng, a Chinese
scholar at Beijing University, notes that during the Cold War Period, the United
States and China were hostile to India and friendly to Pakistan. Since the end of the
Cold War, China has maintained friendly relations with Pakistan, and at the same
time, has taken a more unbiased approach to India.　Although the economic
relationship between the two countries is improving, the Sino-Pakistani security and
strategic nexus has remained a central issue in Sino-India relations ever since P砧istan
and China signed a historic border agreement m March 1963, ceding a section of
territory in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to China.3　At the same time, from an Indian
perspective, growing Chinese presence in Burma and its strategic relationships with the
other small countries in South Asia are some reasons for India's suspicions of China's
intentions in the region.㍊)
27) Ziad Haider, "Sino-Pakistan relations and Xinjiang's Uighurs: Politics, Trade, and Islam along the
Karakoram Highway," Asbn Survey (July/August 2005) Vol. XLV, p. 522.
28) After the nuclear tests, Indian Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpayee sent a letter to the U.S. President
William J. Clinton that implied India conducted the tests to safeguard its security from Pakistan, and
particularly from China. See, Indian Letter to Clinton on Nuclear Teststing, New York Times, May 13,
1998, available at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/indlet.htm (accessed on May 25, 2006).
29) Tim Luard, "China Keeps Pakistan Guessing," BBC News, November 4, 2003.
30) The trade volume between China and India hit new highs in 2004, reaching 13.6 billion. See, Full Text
of Joint Statement of China, India," People's Daily, April 13, 2005.
31) Allen S. Whiting, "The Future of Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim, edりChina and the World:
Chinese Foreign relations in the post Cold War Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 264.
32) Cited in Rahul Bedi, "India and China: Neighborhood Problems," Asia Times, June 17, 2003.
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China-s declared positions on the Kashmir issue have evolved through four distinct
phases. In the 1950s, Beijing upheld a more or less neutral position on the Kashmir
issue. The 1960s and 1970s saw China shifted its position toward public support of
Pakistans views on the issue as Sino-Indian relations deteriorated. Since the early
1980s, however, with China and India moving toward normalization of bilateral
relations, Beijing returned to a position of neutrality even as it sought a balance
between the need to satisfy Pakistan's demands for support and the growing interest
m developing a better relationship with India. By the early 1990s, China's position
became unequivocal: that the Kashmir issue is a bilateral matter to be solved by India
and Pakistan through peaceful means. However, from the Indian point of view China
is one of the parties of the Kashmir dispute. China controls Aksai Chin, twenty
percent of the whole of Kashmir. Nick Easen of CNN notes that although at present
China is officially remaining impartial it has vested interests in Kashmir.34' China
realizes that being a part of the dispute and having special relations with Pakistan
limits its scope for managing the dispute. Also the primary concern for India is
Chinas military support to Pakistan. India wants China to abandon its nuclear and
missile technology transfers to Pakistan. As India sees it, Pakistan is unlikely to
develop their nuclear program without Chinese help. India has no choice but to see
China as an indirect cause of Pakistan's military ambitions. Considering the
relationship between India and China, it can be argued that China also does not meet
the criteria to be a third party mediator to manage the Kashmir conflict.
Japans Policy Toward South Asia: Impartial in the Indo-Pakistan Conf一ict
Japan and South Asia have historical and cultural links which go back two
millennia. During the early 20th century, Japan helped South Asian in their fight for
independence from the British.35'Due to historical links and sympathy Japan has
maintained friendly relationships with all South Asian countries since their
independence. In addition, it has been the largest donor to most of the South Asian
33) John W. Garver, "China's Kashmir Policies," India Review (January 2004), pp. 1-24.
34) Nick Easen, "Aksai Chin: China's Disputed Slice of Kashmir, CNN.com, May 24, 2002.
35) Narashima Murthy, India and Japan: Dimensions of their Relations (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House,
1986), pp. 85-98.
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countries for years. In the post-Cold War period and especially since 9/ll Japan has
promoted its South Asia policy. Japanese government and NGOs have been deeply
involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. At the same time, in the last few years
frequent high profile visits between India and Japan, and between Pakistan and Japan
have demonstrated the increased mutual interests of Japan and the South Asian
countries. In the new century, the main objectives of Japan's policy goals in India
and Pakistan have been 1) economic development and the promotion of trade and
business, particularly with India; 2). promoting democratization and socio-economic
development in Pakistan; 3) combating terrorism 4) reducing nuclear risk and aiming
for an eventual reverse of the nuclear build-up; 5) promoting inter-state relations
through regional cooperation. However, in reality Japan lacks a diplomatic strategy
to implement its goals particularly in the political and security fields in South Asia.
India and Pakistan have been the largest recipients of Japanese ODA in South Asia.
In the year 2002 Japan provided $1.2 billion to South West Asia (South Asia), of which
the major portion went to India and Pakistan. Japan has been playing a significant
role in the development of these countries through a number of ODA projects involved
in building infrastructure, eliminating poverty, and promoting health and education
and the like.
Although the economic role of Japan in India and Pakistan has been significant, it
has been reluctant to play an active role in the India-Pakistan conflict. In fact, it has
always tried to be impartial in the Indo-Pakistan quarrel over Kashmir. Some
prominent scholars have noted that since the early days of the Cold War when all the
major powers have been involved in the contention for power and position in South
Asia, Japan was the only exception, which has never sided with any country in the
36) Savitri Vishwanathan, "Japan's ODA with Nations in South Asia," in K.V. Kesavan and Lalima Verma,
eds., Japan-South Asia: Security and Economic Perspectives (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 2000), p. 147; Also
see OVA White Paper　2003, available at: http://www.mo fa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2003/part4_2.html
(accessed on MaylO, 2006).
37) Interview with Yukio Saita, the Deputy Director of the South-West Asian Division of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, on December 13, 2005.
38) Interview with Yukio Saita, Ibid; See also, "Chapter Two: Regional Diplomacy," Diplomatic Bluebook
2004, available at:
http://www.mo fa.gojp/pohcy/other/bluebook/2004/chap2-a.pdf (accessed on May 10, 2006).
39) Japan's ODA W,伝te Paper 2003, op. at.
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regionalconflictinSouthAsia.41
Infact,Japanhasbeenreluctanttobeinvolvedinanyinternationalconflictssince
WorldWarII.Whyisthisso?Possibleanswersare:1)Japan'slackofinterestin
competingwithanyotherdevelopednationsforleadership;2)thepriorityJapangives
toitseconomicroleratherthantoanypoliticalroleinpromotingpeaceandsecurity'.41).
3)Japan-shistoricalconflictwithherneighbors,andthereactionofJapan'sneighbors
toanylargerpoliticalandmilitaryroleforJapan;and4)lackofanindependent
Japanesestrategyordiplomaticleadership.Nevertheless,Japanhasgraduallytried
topromoteitspoliticalrolesincetheendofthecoldwar.JapanreformeditsODA
charterin1992andonceagainin2003tomakeitpossibletouseitsODAas
diplomaticandeconomicleverageininternationalpeaceandsecurity.Ithasbeen
recognizedforitsmajorpeacemakingroleinCambodiafrom1997to1998andfora
vitalroleintheSriLankanpeaceprocessforthelastseveralyears.Japanhasbeen
seekingpermanentmembershipintheUNSCtoenableittoplayamoreactivepolitical
roleinglobalpeaceandsecurity.
Asapartofitsglobaleffortsfornon-nuclearproliferation,Japanhasurgedboth
IndiaandPakistantocooperatewiththeinternationalcommunityontheissuesofthe
NPTandGTBT.Nevertheless,IndiaandPakistanconductednucleartestsinMay1998.
Despiteitspositionasthetopbilateraldonortherewasnoadvancenoticetothe
Japanesegovernmentaboutthetests.Thesetestscameasagreatshocktothe
Japanesepeopleandtotheforeignministry.Inreaction,Japanimposedeconomic
sanctionsonbothIndiaandPakistanandaskedbothcountriestoreversethese
developments.However,JapaneseODAdiplomacyprovedtobeineffectiveinthis
40) See, "Introduction" in Robert A. Sealapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi and Sungjoo Han, edsリAsian
Security Issues: Regional Security Issues (Berkley: Institution of East Asian Studies, University of
California, 1988), pp..6-7.
41) Interview with the honorable Japanese Ambassador Matsushiro Horiguchi in Dhaka, Bangladesh
March 3, 2005.
42) Paul Mid ford, "Japan's Response to Terror: Di叩atching the SDF to the Arabia Sea," Asian Survey
(March/April 2003) Vol. 43, p. 341.
43) Kazuhiko Togo, Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2003: The Quest for A Proactive Policy (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
44) Masaharu Kohno, "In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the 1990s,"
CNAPS Working Paper肝all 1999), available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_kohno.htm (accessed on April 10, 2006).
45) Diplomatic Bluebook 2004, op. ciと.
46) Takako Hirose, "Japan's Bole in South Asia in th占Post-mId War," in K.V. Kesavan and Lalima Verma,
eds., op. at., p. 99.
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respect. Although Japans bilateral diplomacy failed, its multilateral approach
succeeded to some degree, to the extent that it managed to get international
organizations such as G-8 and the UN Security Council to put pressure on India and
Pakistan. However, India and Pakistan criticized Japan's economic sanctions, which
they said would damage their economies. Three years after the nuclear tests, the
terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001 changed the South Asian security
situation. India and Pakistan gave full support for the "war on terror". As a reward,
Japan, the closest ally of the US in Asia, lifted its economic sanctions on India and
Pakistan. Since then Japan's relationship with India and Pakistan has improved.
India and Pakistan prepared for a fourth war (possibly nuclear) over the Kashmir
dispute after terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament in　2001. During this tense
situation, Japan along with other major powers pressed India and Pakistan for de-
escalation of the tension through visits by key figures to both countries.4　Prime
Minister Koizumi had telephone discussions with both Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
and Pakistani President Musharraf. As a part of its actions against the terrorist
attack, Japan announced its decision to freeze the assets of two suspected Islamic
terrorist organizations Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).
However, after two years of high tension, the two nuclear rivals began a peace
process m the middle of the year 2003. Japan welcomed this. Recently, Prime Minister
Koizumi and Foreign Minister Aso visited India and Pakistan to promote the
relationship. Both leaders urged India and Pakistan to consider the NPT and CTBT,
and at the same time urged India and Pakistan to continue the peace process.
Although Japan has been serious about the nuclear issue, the fact is that it has
never been serious about the Kashmir issue. But, without giving proper attention to
the root cause of the Indo-Pakistan conflict, Japan's efforts for a nuclear-free South
Asia will not be successful. Japanese scholar Mikio Oishi says that Japan has not
addressed the Kashmir issue directly but that there will be no true peace in South Asia
until the Kashmir issue is settled amicably. For any permanent solution of the
Kashmir issue, the true representatives of the Kashmiri people should be included in
47) "The International Community and Japanese Diplomacy 2001," Diplomatic Bluebook 2002.
48) Mikio Oishi, "Japan's Role in Peacemaking in South Asia," in M.D. Dharamdasani, ed., Japan's Role in
South Asia (New Delhi: Kanishka, 2003), pp. 52-69.
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the dialogue. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Japan has ever asked India or
Pakistan to allow Kashmiri separatists groups in particular the moderate groups, who
want a political solution of the dispute, in the peace process. After the nuclear tests in
1998, Japan was inclined to mediate between the two countries on the Kashmir conflict.
The request came from Pakistan. According to Mikio Oism, Japan proposed to hold an
international conference on the Kashmir issue in the wake of the nuclear tests.
However, with India flatly rejecting the offer, Japan easily gave up the idea. But as
the largest donor and an impartial actor in Indo-Pakistan conflict, ,Japan should have
more independent strategies to promote its diplomatic efforts and leadership
possibilities to manage the conflict.
4. Conclusion: A Comparative Assessment of the Ro一e of Major Powers in
Managing Conflict in Kashmir
Based on the above discussion, this paper argues that China lacks credibility and
impartiality regarding India while Russia faces the same problem as regards to
Pakistan. China has maintained a special relationship with Pakistan. Therefore, it does
not fulfill the qualifications to be a mediator in the Kashmir dispute. Meanwhile,
Russian views over Kashmir are not different from the views of the Indian government
and it thus lacks the impartiality to be a mediator. In addition, these two countries
don't have much political or economic leverage on either disputant. As for the U.S.,
although it has strong political and economic leverage on both disputants it lacks
impartiality and credibility as the U.S. has changed its strategy several times in the
past based on its national interests and the evolving situation. Both India and Pakistan
have been skeptical of U.S. motives in this region.
From another perspective, the author argues that to see a peaceful solution of the
Kashmir dispute the current arms race between India and Pakistan should be brought
to an end. Nevertheless, Russia, China, and the U.S. have fueled the arms race between
India and Pakistan. Already, Pakistan and India are spending more money on arms
than they can possibly afford. This is a tragedy for their people, given the poverty in
49) Ibid, p. 64.
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the two countries.
Japan, on the other hand, has been impartial in the India-Pakistan conflict for a
long time. Moreover, as the largest donor, Japan has economic leverage on both India
and Pakistan. In addition, while the other major powers have fueled the South Asian
arms race, Japan has refrained. In view of this difference, this study observes that
compared to other major powers Japan is in an ideal position to mediate the Kashmir
dispute. However, it must also be noted that due to lack of strong political will and
diplomatic ability Japan cannot just use its economic leverage strategically to manage
the conflict. Japan has been reluctant to take the Kashmir issue seriously because of
Indian opposition to mediation of the conflict. But without addressing the root cause
of India-Pakistan rivalry, there will be no light at the end of the tunnel for Japan's
efforts to bring about peace in south Asia.
The following Table illustrates different positions of each major power in regard to
leverage and impartiality in managing the Kashmir conflict. In the case of the US, it
has a high leverage but lacks impartiality. On the other hand, Russia and China lack
both impartiality and leverage on both disputants. Japan, however, is ideally suited as
a mediator because it has both impartiality and sufficient leverage. In comparison to
other major powers, Japan has medium leverage. But it has potential to promote its
leverage by increasing its diplomatic strategy in South Asia.
Criteria The U.S.　　Russia China Japan
Leverage High Low Low Medium
Impartiality Low Absent Absent High
Table: A Comparative Assessment of Major Powers: Criteria for an Ideal
Mediator in Managing Conflict between India and Pakistan
At the end of this paper, the author argues that Kashmir has become a tragic state
for a long time, and humanity is suffering deeply there. These people deserve the right
to determine their own future. As a responsible member of the international
community Japan should and can put convincing pressure on both India and Pakistan
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to accept the benefits of its role as a third party mediator m the Kashmir dispute. But
will India and Pakistan accept Japans mediation role? Indians opposition to any third
party mediation is already mentioned. Nonetheless, this paper suggests that if India
wants to promote its leadership role in South Asia and beyond, it should allow
particularly Japan, a "development partnerH of India for decades, to mediate the
conflict India has failed to resolve bilaterally over the last six decades. India and
Pakistan have fought, made treaties, gone on again to breach them. They need a
guarantee of the agreements that Japan as a mediator can provide.
